Good morning. We convene today to further examine

the evolving situation in Libya.

It has now been nearly 3 weeks, since the international coalition

began airstrikes against Libyan military targets in support of U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1973. And I think it’s—certainly, the

more compelling components—maybe ‘‘compelling’’ is the wrong

word; each situation is compelling—but, I think that the broader

dangers of the humanitarian catastrophe have been averted, even

as some circumstances still continue. And, as we know, civilians

are still dying. And the road forward really needs further definition.

So, it’s my pleasure to welcome, today, three very excellent witnesses

to help us understand what’s happening today and to think

through how the conflict might be resolved.

Richard Haass is a friend of the committee and longtime friend

of mine, personally. His government service was marked by, I

think, clear-eyed appraisals of difficult situations. And, as president

of the Council on Foreign Relations, he’s been out front, telling

it like it is, which is what he ought to do. And we expect nothing

less today.

Tom Malinowski has served in a number of senior positions in

the Clinton administration. I think he’s best known as the Washington

director for Human Rights Watch. And from that post, he

has been a tireless advocate for human rights, and we look forward

to his assessment here today.

And our third witness, Dirk Vandewalle, is a professor at Dartmouth

College who has spent much of his distinguished career

focused on Libya. He brings a wealth of expertise. And we appreciate

his presence and look forward to his insights.

I said last week, and I reiterate, that I do believe we have strategic

interests in the outcome in Libya. I’ve always suggested that

we can layer or tier different stages of interest of the United

States, from vital national security interests, to a legitimate

national security interest, to a national security interest, to an interest.

I mean, these interests are of varying degrees of urgency

and strategic importance and value.

But, there are clearly strategic interests, certainly in keeping the

hopes of reformers across the Arab world alive, and in making sure

that the Arab Awakening, which may well offer one of the most important

strategic shifts since the fall of the Berlin Wall—depending

on how it comes out, obviously—but, keeping that moving and

countering the violent extremism of al-Qaeda. Certainly, a peaceful

turnover in a place like Egypt, as the result of an acquiescence by

the military in the face of civilian protests, is far more preferable

than IEDs, military engagement, and suicide bombers, and other

violence that has been attached to many of the movements and

transitions and confrontations of the rest of that part of the world.

And also, I think there is an interest in demonstrating to the region’s

leaders that, when the global community makes up its mind

regarding a particular shared value, as was expressed in the

United Nations resolution, that there is a value for people understanding

that peaceful endeavors are not going to be met by repression

and large-scale violence, where, in fact, it is both reasonable

as well as possible for the United States to make a difference. I

think the President articulated those kinds of differences that

exist, and we need to be sensitive to them.

Obviously, these uprisings have spread with enormous velocity.

And that is a testimony to the new interconnectivity of the world

and the pent-up frustrations of people throughout the region, particularly

these huge populations of young people, who have little

opportunity for jobs or education or outlet, but who are all connected

to what the rest of the world is doing and living.

It’s going to take time for us to fully appreciate this transformation.

But, we can agree that this is setting a new direction for

the Middle East, even as we have some uncertainties about some

aspects of that direction. Moreover, the United States has important

bedrock values that we must uphold. And we also have a role

to play. It’s a role that differs from country to country, depending

on those interests, as they are defined, and also depending on our

capabilities and on the possibilities.

When it comes to Libya, the President faced a difficult balancing

act. On the one hand, he had a responsibility to help prevent a

humanitarian catastrophe; on the other hand, he certainly wanted

to make sure that the United States did not suddenly start out on

an adventure that brings us to a place of being bogged down in another

ground war. I believe he struck the right balance. And America’s

military role, which was limited from the beginning, is diminishing

even further now, as we speak.

There is still a need for robust military protections for the civilian

population in Libya, and NATO will take the lead on that.

Even as we continue to assist the NATO mission, we will also

apply other means to influence the outcome. We need to use stringent

economic sanctions and aggressive diplomatic pressure to help

convince Qadhafi to transition.

There have been some encouraging signs. One of his most influential

and longest serving advisors, Moussa Koussa, defected last

week, opening the possibility of new insights into how to persuade

Qadhafi, himself, to go. Defections are, needless to say, a critical

indicator of people’s beliefs about where things are moving and who

might actually ultimately win. And I think that Moussa Koussa’s

defection was important.

Yet, despite the best intentions, the opposition is, in fact, poorly

trained, poorly armed, and poorly organized. They have not proven

capable of holding on to gains deep in pro-Qadhafi territory. Obviously,

they need assistance of one kind or another, and it is appropriate

that the international community is working through exactly

what that will be.

Libya’s Transition National Council has put forward a commendable

political program that imagines a more stable, more tolerant,

and more democratic Libya. They will need outside support for

that. And I hope we will have a couple of members of that council

visit us here in Washington, perhaps as early as next week. I met

with them in Cairo and have extended an invitation. And I’m confident

that they would like to take us up on that at a convenient

moment.

So, however the situation in Libya ends, whether it’s with regime

collapse, total and complete, or a rebel military victory, or an extended

stalemate, the process of putting Libya back together will

be a complicated one. But, it is a task where the United States, the

United Nations, and the Arab League all have roles to play.

I might add that, while it is a country of vast size geographically—

I think something like three times the size of Texas—it is

a country of only 6 million people, about the population of my State

of Massachusetts. So, I believe that, in the end, this will be both

manageable and not exceedingly costly to the global community.

Senator Lugar.

Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Dr. Haass, if you’d begin, and then Mr. Malinowski and Dr.

Vandewalle.

Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Haass.

Mr. Malinowski.

Thank you, Mr. Malinowski, very good testimony.

Mr. Vandewalle.

Thank you very much. Very thoughtful and helpful.

And I’m going to pick up in a moment on some of the questions.

Let me begin my comments before I ask any questions. I just

want to—I was just telling Senator Lugar, I tried to call him the

other night; he was obviously out celebrating. But, I wanted to

wish him, and I think everybody on the committee wants to join

in wishing him, many happy returns on his birthday that he celebrated

just a couple of days ago. So, we join in doing that. Ageless.

We won’t mention numbers.

Let me just say a word about a political reality. You know, I’ve

listened to these debates, now, on this committee for 27 years; and

my friend, here, for longer than me. And there’s kind of a pattern

to them, in a way, exacerbated since, frankly, Clinton and Bosnia,

where there seems to be sort of an automatic—that one President

of one party does this, everybody’s against, there; and if somebody

else does that, everybody’s against, over here. And I’m not sure our

foreign policy is as well served by that.

I can guarantee everybody—I guarantee you, that, sure as I am

sitting here today, that if President Obama had simply turned his

back on the Arab League and Gulf States’ request and on the opposition’s

request, and we sat here, and CNN and everybody was consumed

with the slaughter in Benghazi, we would be hearing how

weak the President is, how feckless our policy was, and how completely

without regard to American values this moment was, and

the administration was, with respect to Libya. I just guarantee you.

We already heard some of that about the timeframe that it took.

And people were warming up, ready to go even further, had the

Arab League not changed the equation.

Now, a bunch of us, in talking about this at the outset, said, ‘‘We

don’t do it unilaterally. We can’t do it unilaterally. It would be inappropriate,

for any number of reasons,’’ and suggested that the

predicate had to be the United Nations first; Arab League, African

Union, GCC, some combination thereof. Then, lo and behold, we

actually got all of them. They all stepped up and said, ‘‘You’ve got to do this.’’

Now, imagine—I just want people to imagine the hue and cry,

had we done nothing, in the face of all of those pleas. Moreover,

there are a million and a half guestworker Egyptians in Libya who

were at significant risk. People seem to be forgetting that. And the

Egyptians, who we have supported openly and are invested in,

were significantly concerned about what might happen to them, in

terms of hostage-taking and/or other things that might have followed.

Moreover, we would be engaged in a massive refugee exculpatory,

sort of, who-lost-Libya debate, combined with, ‘‘How are we

going to deal with all these refugees, and what’s our response going to be?’’

I think it’s hard to suggest that, even with a stalemate, if that’s

where we are—and I want to come back to that in a minute—that,

with a Qadhafi who can’t sell his oil, with a Qadhafi who has a

divided country, with an opposition that is now in a position where

they know this army cannot move on them in their part of the

country, you have a very different equation, with a battle—a legitimate

battle for the hearts and minds and future of the country,

which we’ve encouraged in many parts of the world, and we would

love to see, openly. We’d give our eyetooth to have that in Iran

tomorrow. So, it seems to me that we’ve got to sort of put this into

honest discussion.

Now, Mr. Vandewalle, you’ve sort of begun with an assumption

about Qadhafi’s departure. And I want to ask you, is that because

you believe it is an inevitability or you think that’s the only working

place from which you can start?

Mr. Malinowski, do you want to comment on that?

Is there any reason—I ask this of any of you—

we have frozen $31–$33 billion of Qadhafi’s assets that we have

access to and capacity to freeze. That’s a lot of money. And that

money can, in fact, go to pay for a lot of this operation and/or a

lot of the rebuild, can it not?

Mr. Vandewalle.

Right.

What percentage did you say, of the total revenues

of Libya, are oil?

Ninety-five percent is oil.

Senator Lugar.

Just before I recognize Senator Shaheen, I might

just say quickly that I think that’s a very, very good point—several

points—with respect to what’s needed, et cetera. I would point out

that Secretary Rumsfeld promised us that the Iraqi oil was going

to pay for the war. And there was—very little effort has been made

to, in fact, translate that into reality.

I see no reason why, with respect to Libya, if you had $170 billion

in reserves and $30 billion in seized assets and a continuing

revenue stream of some 95 percent of its country’s revenue—this

is an oil-rich country, and the notion that they could not take some

designated component of that, as a prerequisite to any of these

developmental efforts, is beyond my comprehension. It should be

insisted on and absolutely guaranteed.

So, I think there’s a way forward. And we should welcome the

opportunity, with a readily paid-for capacity, to, in fact, help another

country on the African Continent develop the kinds of institutions

and capacity that will help us all, I think, in the longrun.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator Corker.

Well, thank you, Senator Corker. I think that

point is an important one. And I would agree with you completely.

I have no notion in my head, swirling around, that I envisioned

some huge United States post-effort here. I think that we can be

part of it and helpful, maybe help shape and frame. But, I would

clearly envision that to be far more in a zone of interest and activity

of others who are engaged in this effort now, and who are much

more proximate, and frankly, have a longer history of engagement

with Libya. And I think they’re quite anxious, actually. I just met

with folks in both Great Britain and France, and I think they’re

prepared to assume that kind of leadership role.

So, I think that we can heed your words with respect to your and

other people’s concerns about the mission creep, here. I think a lot

of us are very, very determined not to, under any circumstances,

see that evolution.

Let me also make a comment, if I can, about your initial comments

on what I’d said earlier. I always listen carefully to a Senator,

who’s my friend and who indeed worked as diligently and as

bipartisanly as you could—as nonpartisanly—on the START

Treaty; and Senator Lugar, likewise. And, on reflection, I absolutely

understand how you would—could take my comments. And

they were probably just not crafted as sharply as they should have

been. And I, in no way, intended to assert that you or someone else

in the Senate—I really had in mind, to be honest with you, some

very notable, highly identifiable, and well-known media outlets and

personalities who are automatic on these things. And I, by no

means, intended to suggest that Senators, you know, are engaging

in that.

But, I do think—and I stand by those words—I think there are

those out there who are just instantaneous in these, whether it’s

both of our national committees. But, the politics of these things

often just kind of get out of control. And I think we’re all better

served if we can, you know, keep that away.

But, to whatever degree that that was interpretable in a way

that, you know, suggested otherwise, I certainly don’t want you to

have that belief. And I don’t intend that.

Senator Menendez.

Senator Menendez, can I interrupt you just for

one second? I apologize.

In 5 minutes, both Senator Lugar and I have to go meet with

President Perez. Could we ask you to close out the hearing, if that’s

possible, if any other colleagues come——

I think she has another round.

If I could thank all of the witnesses very, very much for coming.

And I think it’s been helpful, and it’s helped to actually shed some

light on a number of different options as we go forward. So, we’re

very appreciative.

I apologize for interrupting.